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ABSTRACT 
 
We demonstrate that personal connections amongst U.S. politicians have a significant impact on 
Senate voting behavior. Networks based on alumni connections between politicians are consistent 
predictors of voting behavior. We estimate sharp measures that control for common characteristics of 
the network, as well as heterogeneous impacts of a common network characteristic across votes. We 
find that the effect of alumni networks is close to 60% as large as the effect of state-level 
considerations. The network effects we identify are stronger for more tightly linked networks, and at 
times when votes are most valuable.  We show that politicians use school ties as a mechanism to 
engage in vote trading (“logrolling”), and that alumni networks help facilitate the procurement of 
discretionary earmarks.   
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The passage or failure of any piece of legislation in the U.S. Senate depends ultimately on the 
individual votes of the legislators.  While many influences determine whether a given legislator votes 
for or against a bill, subtle influences can in some instances be powerful determinants of voting 
behavior, and thus final vote outcomes.  In this paper, we explore one particular channel of influence: 
that of personal social networks.  We show that our identified social networks can have large impacts 
on voting behavior, beyond those currently explored by the literature.  In addition, our empirical 
strategy to isolate the impact of social networks exploits rich data comprising firms (and employment) 
in a Senator’s home constituency, which allows us to incorporate market information into measures of 
a bill’s importance.  Specifically, important bills are defined at the Senator-bill level, which offers a 
new way to classify the same bill as important or unimportant for different sets of Senators.  This turns 
out to be important in mapping Senators’ interests, and thus the predicted use of influence, across the 
social networks we examine.     
  Exploiting the complete Senate voting record over the past 20 years, we demonstrate that 
social networks have a significant impact on the voting behavior of U.S. politicians.  The primary 
network measure we exploit is based on the alumni networks of Senators.  An advantage of our 
approach is that unlike many social networks,
1 these education networks are formed decades before 
the voting behavior we attempt to explain.  We utilize these well-defined networks to isolate a 
widespread pattern of vote trading (or “logrolling”) that has typically been difficult to identify 
empirically in the literature.
2 
Our first main result is that alumni networks influence Senate voting behavior, even after 
controlling for other well-known predictors of voting behavior.  For example, the percentage of 
Senators in one’s alumni network that vote in favor of a given bill is strongly related to a Senator’s 
own likelihood of voting in favor of that bill.  Further, the impact of school ties on voting is 
monotonically increasing with the strength of network, and is robust to a variety of different 
specifications and controls.  Importantly, we also demonstrate that this alumni network effect is not 
driven by a particular school, Senator, ideology, or time period. 
  We use alumni networks as a setting in which to examine the practice and implications of 
logrolling in the U.S. Senate.  Logrolling is the colloquial term for vote trading, and refers to the idea 
                                                 
1 See Jackson (2005) for a review of network applications in economics, Williams (2009) for a review of network 
applications in politics, and Fowler et. al (2009) for a discussion of the causality inference problems that arise when 
studying typical political networks such as cosponsorship networks, which are formed endogenously during the legislative 
process. 
2 See Stratmann (1992) and Stratmann (1995).  
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that a politician may, at times, trade away his or her vote on one issue in return for votes on some 
other issue of more concern to his or her constituents.  A key feature of our empirical design is that 
we are able to examine this issue by exploiting situations where network mechanisms are likely to be 
more utilized, while the characteristics of the network itself remain constant.  We do this by focusing 
on: i.) votes that are "irrelevant" to those firms located in a Senator’s home state, and ii.) votes that are 
close to passing (or failing to pass).  The mechanism behind this approach is to alter the supply of, 
and demand for, votes within a network while holding network characteristics constant.  For example, 
supplying a vote when the bill in question is irrelevant to one’s constituent firms is presumably not 
very costly.  Similarly, close votes are times when the marginal vote is very valuable, and hence 
demand to influence peers is likely strongest.  Thus, these are the exact times that members would be 
expected to exert the most pressure on fellow network-connected Senators to trade their votes. 
To give an illustrative example from our sample of school networks in Congress, consider the 
voting that took place on the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 2001.  This bill 
was written in part to appropriate a significant amount of money for the energy industry.  The vote 
was split largely along party lines, and as such in order to get the bill to vote (and ultimately pass), the 
Republican party needed to curry a few Democrats votes.  Not surprisingly, this bill was strongly 
supported by the Texas Senatorial delegation, given the long-running prominence of the energy 
industry in the Texas economy.  One Texas Senator, Republican Phil Gramm, received both his 
undergraduate and doctoral degrees from the University of Georgia.  He shared this alumni network 
tie with Zell Miller, however not much else, as Miller was a Democrat, and a Senator from Georgia – 
a state for which the energy industry had a relatively inconsequential presence.  However, on this 
particular bill Senator Miller broke with his fellow Democrats and voted, like Senator Gramm, in 
favor of the bill.  In fact, only six Democrats in the entire Senate voted for the bill, and those others 
who did came from states such as Arkansas and New Mexico, for which oil and natural gas 
represented a large and important industry.  Senator Miller’s state had no tie with the industry, with in 
fact the other Democratic Senator from Georgia, Max Cleland, voting against the energy bill.  The tie 
that did appear was in the alumni network (in this case across party lines) shared by Senators Gramm 
and Miller.  This example of voting in line with school networks (controlling for other voting 
determinants, such as party), represents a systematic pattern across the universe of votes in the United 
States Senate.       
Our strategy employs a unique bill classification approach that categorizes each bill over the 
1989-2008 period as being related to certain industries, depending upon the text of the bill.  We  
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expect those bills that impact firms in the Senator’s home state to be the bills that the Senator will 
have a vested interest in voting either for or against, regardless of network effects; conversely, the 
remaining "irrelevant" votes for the Senator should be those for which her network should have more 
persuasive ability in affecting her behavior.  We find exactly this pattern in the data.  The effect for 
irrelevant votes is nearly 100% larger.  A similar dichotomy can be thought of with respect to close 
votes.  For these votes we again find evidence consistent with Senators using the network to actively 
influence voting behavior when the marginal value of votes is higher (and again, evidence against a 
simple unobservable characteristic explanation).  On these close votes, the network influence on 
voting behavior is over twice as large.  Finally, on votes that are both irrelevant and close, the impact 
of one’s network on voting is over 200% larger than the unconditional effect. 
  We also try to rule out an alternative explanation based on heterogeneous impacts of our fixed 
network characteristic. For instance, it may be exactly when a vote is irrelevant to a Senator that her 
intrinsic preferences are more expressed; preferences which can be correlated across the network.  To 
address this possibility directly, for each vote we separate the Senator’s network into those who have a 
vested interest in the bill, and those to whom it is irrelevant.  If the heterogeneous impact of a 
network characteristic is driving the results, we should see a given Senator’s voting most correlated 
with those Senators in her network to whom the bill is irrelevant.  By the same logic the Senator’s 
vote should be less correlated to those who are voting due to a separate vested interest (i.e., those 
Senators who have many constituent firms impacted by the given bill).  The direct network influence 
channel works in the exact opposite direction: Senators who have a vested interest do the most to curry 
votes in their favor, while the Senators with no vested interest do little.  Thus, if there is a direct 
channel of influence at work, the given Senator’s votes should follow more with these vested-interest 
Senators.  The results from these tests provide evidence against a heterogeneous impact of some fixed 
network characteristic.  In particular, the school effect we mention above is entirely driven by the 
impact of those school connected votes for whom the vote is relevant.  Votes by Senators in the 
network who do not have a vested interest in the bill have no impact on the given Senator’s votes.   
  To give an idea of the magnitude of the school network effect, we find that a one standard 
deviation increase in the percentage of school connected Senators with a vested interest in a bill who 
vote in favor of a bill implies a 5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a given Senator voting 
in favor of a bill (controlling for party influences, state influences, congress-session effects, and a host 
of other controls).  To put this into context, we compare it to the effect of state-level considerations 
for the Senator.  State-level considerations are arguably one of the largest determinants of Senator  
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behavior, as state constituents ultimately determine re-election outcomes.  We find that the alumni 
network effect is close to 60% of the size of the state-level effect, indicating that network effects are 
significant in magnitude.   
To better pin down the mechanism behind the logrolling we document in this paper, and how 
these logrolling networks may be playing out in the Senate, we also explore variation in influence 
within a given network.  Specifically, we find evidence suggesting that Senators are more likely to 
logroll with network members who are on more powerful Senate committees.  We also examine 
another potential benefit of being in a logrolling network with school-tied friends, namely in securing 
discretionary funding for one’s state.  In particular, we show that having a member of one’s alumni 
network on a powerful Senate committee is positively related to the acquisition of discretionary 
earmark funding for one’s own state, above and beyond the usual determinants of earmarks. 
  Collectively, our findings provide evidence that a new form of personal connections, namely 
those based on past educational links, have a significant impact on the voting behavior of U.S. 
politicians.  Further, the magnitude of these network effects is economically significant.  And although 
pinning down a causal effect of networks is of course extremely difficult, we believe that taken as a 
whole, our results present a compelling circumstantial case that networks have a direct impact on 
political behavior.  Hence, our results imply important considerations for constituents regarding their 
legislators; specifically, the size and scope of the networks to which legislators have access in order to 
curry favor for votes can potentially be an important state variable to their constituents (both 
individuals and firms). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the related literature; 
Section II describes the data; and Section III explores the network characteristics in the U.S. Senate.  
Section IV presents the basic impact of alumni networks on Senate voting behavior; Section V then 
examines the logrolling mechanism in greater depth; and Section VI examines the role of school ties 
in securing discretionary funding for one’s state.  Section VII provides a series of robustness checks; 
Section VIII discusses the implications of our results; and Section IX concludes. 
 
I. Related Literature 
Our paper adds to a large literature that studies the factors that influence the behavior of 
elected officials.  In addition to political party and constituent interests (see, for example, Stigler  
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(1971) and Peltzman (1985)), we demonstrate that personal connections are an important determinant 
of politicians’ voting behavior.
3  Importantly, we demonstrate that even after controlling for the 
impact of political ideology (see Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004), Kau and Rubin (1979, 1993), 
Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004), McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (1997), McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 
(2006), and Poole and Rosenthal (1985), (1997), (2007)), network ties influence legislator behavior.
4  
Our focus on alumni networks also adds to a growing body of work that explores the impact 
of different types of social networks in Congress (see, for example, Bogue and Marlaire (1975), 
Burkett and Skvoretz (2006), Caldeira and Patterson (1987), Fowler (2006a, 2006b), Patterson (1959), 
Porter et. al (2005, 2006), Routt (1938), Young (1966), and Williams (2009)).  An advantage of our 
approach relative to many of these studies is that our network measure is exogenous to the political 
process itself.  Further, our network ties are formed decades before the voting behavior we attempt to 
explain.  Lastly, we show that these clearly delineated alumni networks offer a window into the 
practice of logrolling in Congress, which has been generally been difficult to identify empirically in the 
literature (see Stratmann (1992) and Stratmann (1995) for theory and evidence on this issue). 
Since our focus is on isolating a specific channel through which network effects operate in 
Congress, namely through well-defined alumni networks, our work also relates to a vast literature that 
demonstrates that neighbors, peers, parents, and siblings can impact a long list of individual behaviors 
ranging from educational attainment,
5 to welfare decisions (Bertrand et. al (2000)), to spousal choices 
(Fernandez et. al (2004)).
6   
 
II. Data 
  We use a variety of novel data sources to create the sample in this paper.  First we hand-
collect the complete biographical record of all Senators from the 101st through 110th Congresses, 
using the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress available online.
7  From this website, 
                                                 
3 See also Hibbing and Marsh (1991), Stratmann (2000), Pande (2003), Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), and Washington 
(2007) for evidence that personal characteristics such as service length, age, religion, race, gender, and the presence of a 
daughter in one’s family can affect the behavior of elected officials.    
4 See also Levitt (1996), Ansolabehere et. al (2001), Synder and Groseclose (2000), Kalt and Zupan (1990), and Mian et. al 
(2009) for various perspectives on separating out the impact of ideology versus party interests, constituent interests, and 
special interests. 
5 See, for example, Black et. al (2005), Dahl and Lochner (2005), Hanushek et. al (2003), Hoxby (2000), Ruhm (2004), and 
Sacerdote (2001,2007). 
6 See also Manski (1995) and Gaviria and Raphael (2001). 
7 See http://bioguide.Congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp.  All of the results in the paper pertain to the U.S. Senate 
only; however, we show in the Appendix Table A6 that our main results hold in the U.S. House of Representatives as well.  
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and from the individual websites of the Senators, we extract information on academic institutions 
attended, religious affiliations, birthdates, home towns, and past work experience.  We use this data to 
create the alumni connection and other connection variables that we exploit in our analysis.   
  Another key source of data that we collect is the complete legislative record of all Senators on 
all bills from the 101st through 110th Congresses.  We collect this from the Library of Congress’ 
Thomas database.  Each "Congress" is two years long, and is broken into two one-year-long 
"Sessions."  Therefore, 10 Congresses represents twenty years of Congressional data from 1989-2008.  
We collect the result of each roll call vote for the twenty-year period in each chamber of the Congress, 
and record the individual votes for every Congressman voting on the bill (or abstaining).  We choose 
to start with the raw bill data, rather than use alternate, publicly available versions of the 
Congressional roll call data (see, for example, the Voteview website, as well as McCarty, Poole and 
Rosenthal (1997), McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006), Poole and Rosenthal (1985), (1997), (2007), 
among many others), or the Political Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) House Roll Call Database 
(Aldrich, Brady, de Marchi, McDonald, Nyhan, Rohde, and Tofias (2008)), because we exploit the text 
of each piece of legislation as described below. 
Specifically, in a number of our tests, we utilize the content of the bills being voted on.  To do 
so, we download the full text of all bills being voted on over our sample.  We collect the full-text data 
jointly from the websites of the Government Printing Office (GPO), and from the Thomas database.  
We then parse and analyze the full bill text to classify each bill into its main purpose.  For our tests, 
we attempt to assign each bill to one (or more) of the 49 industry classifications used in Fama and 
French (1997).
8  To do this we first construct a set of keywords for each industry.  We then create an 
executable (shown in Figure 1), in which we input all bills and their corresponding full-text and assign 
bills to industries based on the count of the number of times these keywords appear in a given bill.  
We only assign a bill to an industry if the number of instances of a particular keyword exceeds a 
certain threshold of frequency on a given bill relative to its overall frequency in the entire population 
of bills.
9  Individual bills can be assigned to more than one industry; however, we use a conservative 
assignment procedure such that our procedure only results in industry assignments of any kind for 
less than 20% of all bills, and specifically only those bills where we can confidently gauge that an 
                                                 
8 The “Fama-French 49” industry definitions map specific 4-digit SIC (standard industry classification) codes to 49 
different industry categories, and are publicly available online from: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/. 
9 We have experimented with various thresholds, and our results are not sensitive to the particular threshold we employ.  
Please see the Appendix for more details on our bill classification procedure.  
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industry is likely to be affected by the bill in question.   
Figure 1 presents an example of a particular bill that was assigned only to the Fama-French 
industry #30: Petroleum and Natural Gas, based on the relative frequency of pre-specified keywords 
in the bill that pertain to this industry.  Figure 1 displays the summary text at the top of the bill, which 
indicates that the bill clearly pertains to the oil and gas industry.  The data Appendix provides more 
details on our bill assignment procedure.  We have compared our bill categorizations to those used in 
other work (see, for example, Aldrich, Brady, de Marchi, McDonald, Nyhan, Rohde, and Tofias 
(2008), among others), but prefer our approach because it achieves our explicit goal of assigning each 
bill to the specific industries (and thus firms) that are potentially affected, rather than to the specific 
policy issues under consideration. 
   
III. Social Networks in the U.S. Senate 
  Table I presents summary statistics for our sample.  Our sample covers the 20-year period of 
the 101st-110th Congresses.  The unit of observation in our analysis is the Senator-vote level.  For 
example, Senator Clinton’s vote of "yea" in the 110th Congressional Session on Recorded Vote No. 2 
(regarding Senate Joint Resolution 9) is a single observation.  Table I shows that we have roughly 
650,000 vote-level observations for the Senate, made by 209 Senators over this twenty year period.  
The total number of Senators over this 20 year period may seem low, however the incumbency re-
election rate is quite high for the U.S. Senate.  Of the votes cast, over 65% are "yes" votes.  The 
remainder of Table I presents additional summary statistics.  Each "PctSumYes*" variable measures 
the percentage of the group in question that votes yes for a given bill, on average.  So, for instance, 
the average percentage of Senators from the same school as a Senator that vote yes is 63.8%.  These 
percentage measures are, not surprisingly, on average nearly identical regardless of grouping, and 
roughly match the overall sample average percentage of yes votes.  The sum variables are measured 
similarly, but simply add the number of Senators that vote yes on a given bill.  For instance, the 
average number of total yes votes from a given Senator’s party on an average bill is 31 (roughly half 
the sample average).   
  Note that we have run all the tests in this paper using samples that consist only of final 
passage votes (i.e., the final votes on each of the bills in our sample), as well as samples that consist 
only of bills where we can ascertain that at least one industry is affected by the bill (and hence that the  
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bill is relevant to at least one Senator), and our results are unchanged.  Thus our results are not driven 
by multiple versions of the same bill, or by non-substantive and/or procedural votes.
10       
  Table II examines in more detail two specific characteristics of Senators.  The first is the main 
network measure we use in the paper, namely alumni networks.  We define everything at the degree 
level in Panel A. Thus, each of the 209 Senators that served in the Senate over this period is included 
once in these tabulations, but Senators often have degrees from more than one academic institution, 
hence the total number of degrees exceeds the total number of Senators.  So, our 209 Senators earned 
375 degrees that we could match back to colleges and universities.  We list in this table those 
universities that represent the largest number of degrees in the U.S. Senate.  The most connected 
university to the U.S. Senate is Harvard University, followed by Yale, Virginia, Stanford, and 
Georgetown.
11  In addition, a number of the Senators were Rhodes Scholars, leading to a surprisingly 
high position of Oxford University on the connectedness list.  Panel B contains the religious 
affiliations of the U.S. Senate.  As can be seen, religious affiliation was unavailable for 42 of the 
Senators, so we have a total of 167 with religious group information.  The most common religious 
affiliation is Roman Catholic, which accounts for nearly 25% of all Senators, followed by Methodist, 
Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Jewish, and Baptist.
12    
 
IV. The Impact of Networks on Senate Voting Behavior 
  We first examine the voting behavior of U.S. politicians, and how this behavior is affected by 
social networks.  In order to test whether a politician’s network affects her voting behavior, we need 
to define measures of possible groups that could influence her behavior.  The key network we focus 
on is the alumni network. 
 
IV.A The Impact of School Ties on Senate Voting 
  Our key tests focus on the impact of alumni networks on the voting behavior of each Senator.  
The primary measure we employ in our tests is the percentage of Senators in a given Senator’s alumni 
network that vote in favor of the bill.  The idea behind this measure is that it proxies for the amount 
                                                 
10 Note that this separation into final votes is very similar to Theriault (2006), which separates procedural and non-
procedural votes.  Our final votes category matches closely to his “Substantive Votes” category.  Please see the data 
Appendix for more details on the subsamples we have analyzed. 
11 We demonstrate later in the paper (in Table VI) that our results are not driven by Harvard or any other single school. 
12 An expanded version of Table II that includes detailed information on the composition of each of the networks in 
terms of political affiliation, religion, and geographic location is included as Table A3.  
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of potential prodding a Senator could be receiving from within his or her alumni social network to 
vote for the given bill.
13  The main dependent variable we use is simply whether the given Senator 
voted yes (or no) on the given bill.   
To control for other determinants of a Senator’s voting we construct a number of control 
variables.  The first is the percentage of the Senator’s party voting in favor of the given bill.  For 
instance, if we are considering a Democrat, it would be the percentage of all other Democrats voting 
in favor of the given bill, and equivalently for Republicans.  The intuition behind this measure is that 
it will control for anything that is party-agenda related at the very fine level of the given vote on the 
specific bill in question.  We also compute a dummy equal to one if the other Senator from the same 
state votes in favor of the bill; the idea behind this measure is that it will again control for anything 
that is important at a state-agenda level for the given vote on the specific bill.  In sum, to stress the 
granularity of these variables, these are quite fine controls for the party- and state-level importance of 
the given vote for the specific bill being voted upon.  And finally, when constructing these measures for 
a particular Senator-vote observation we always remove the impact of each individual Senator’s own 
votes, such that these measures reflect only the behavior of other Senators who are from the same 
school network, same party, or same state, as the Senator in question.   
    Lastly, we include a number of fixed effects in the specifications.  First, we include a fixed 
effect for the given Senator.  This captures a Senator’s average propensity to vote yes on any given 
bill, which could vary across Senators.  We also include a fixed effect for Congress (as we mention in 
Section II, our detailed voting and biographical data cover the 101st-110th Congresses).  As different 
Congresses often focus on quite different legislation (e.g., defense vs. healthcare vs. fiscal policy, etc.), 
this is meant to capture anything specifically related to these different agendas covered, and voted 
upon, across Congresses.  Lastly, we also include in many specifications quite fine fixed effects at the 
Congress-session-vote level.  That is, these are fixed effects for the specific vote on the specific bill, in 
the given Congress and session.  These control for anything special that might affect all Senators’ 
votes on the specific bill (e.g., deadline for approval).  We obviously cannot include both this fixed 
effect and the Congress fixed effect in the same regression (as Congress is a linear combination of 
                                                 
13 We also explore a measure that uses the sum of Senators in a given Senator’s alumni network that vote in favor of the 
bill; the sum measure exploits the idea that it is the absolute number of fellow Senators putting pressure on a Senator that 
has the biggest effect on voting.  One benefit of the percentage measure is that it abstracts from the size of network, while 
the sum measure is jointly measuring the behavior of the network and the size of the network.  To narrow the focus more 
on behavior, we focus mainly on the percentage measure; however, we also show results for both the percentage and sum 
measures.  
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Congress-session-vote), so we use varying specifications including either fixed effect.  Lastly, we 
adjust all standard errors for clustering at the Senator level to account for the fact that Senators may 
exhibit a tendency to vote in a similar way on multiple roll-call votes. 
  Table III presents the results of these voting behavior regressions.  The observation-level is a 
given Senator’s vote on the Senate roll-call (recorded) vote in question for the specific bill.  Thus, for 
a given roll-call Senate vote we average 97 observations, or recorded yea, nay, or abstain votes (as 
there are occasionally a few Senators who miss a given vote). The dependent variable we focus on is 
Yes, which is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the given Senator votes yes on the given roll-call vote, 
and 0 otherwise.  In this table we run regressions in a linear probability model; however in Table VII 
we also run logit and probit specifications and show that these imply slightly larger school effects in 
magnitude and significance.  We prefer to use the linear framework as we can include relatively 
granular fixed effects, better controlling for fixed variation on a number of dimensions.
14  In columns 
1-3 of Table III we focus on the % measures of the independent variables, and in columns 4-7 we 
show results for the sum measures.  The variable of interest in Column 1 is School Connected Votes, 
which is the percentage of the other Senators in the given Senator’s alumni network who vote yes on 
the given bill.  We also include controls for State Votes and Party Votes, which represent the percentage 
of the Senator’s state and other party members voting in favor of the bill, respectively. 
  Column 1 indicates that the voting of other members of a Senator’s alumni network is 
significantly related to the Senator’s own vote, even after controlling for general party voting, the 
voting of the other Senator in one’s state, and both Congress and Senator fixed effects.  In Column 2, 
we include these same controls, plus both Senator and the finest Congress-session-vote level fixed 
effects, and find a similar result.  The coefficient on School Connected Votes of 0.052 (t=3.31) in Column 
2 implies that controlling for the general voting on the given bill, the Senator’s own tendency to 
approve legislation, the party’s views on the given bill, and the state-implied importance level of the 
given bill, a one standard deviation increase in the percent of the Senator’s network voting for the bill 
implies a roughly 2 percentage point increase in the Senator’s likelihood to vote in favor of the bill.  In 
Section V, we construct sharper measures of the direct influence exerted through the network, and for 
this cleaner measure of direct influence, the magnitude of the network effect more than doubles.   
 
                                                 
14 See Greene et al. (2002) for a discussion of the statistical problems associated with the use of fixed effects in non-linear 
regression frameworks.  
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IV.B Alternate Measure and Variation in Strength of Network 
  Next we re-define the alumni network measure using sums (as opposed to percentages) in the 
Senate.  The coefficient in Column 3 of Table III of 0.008 (t=3.44) implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in the number of Senators in the given Senator’s alumni network voting in favor of 
the bill increases the Senator’s likelihood of voting for the bill by 3.4 percentage points.
15  This is 
comparable, although somewhat larger in magnitude to the effect using the percentage measure. 
  In the last two columns of Table III we exploit variation in the strength of alumni network 
links.  If it is the alumni network impacting voting, then we would expect that the stronger the 
network connection, the more influence the network should have on a given Senator’s voting 
behavior.  Therefore, in Columns 4 and 5 we create two new measures of increasing connectedness.  
First, Column 4 measures the effect on a Senator’s voting of those Senators that have not only gone 
to the same school as the Senator, but also have the same degree from that school (e.g., both have 
JDs from Yale).  Even stronger, Column 5 measures the effect for networks of Senators that have 
gone to the same school, received the same degree, and overlapped on campus at the same time (e.g., 
both Harvard MBAs in 1965).
16  Consistent with the alumni network having an influence on voting, 
the impact of schools is monotonically increasing with the strength of network.  From Column 7, the 
impact of the most connected network measure is over twice as large (0.020 (t=2.49)) as the other two 
measures (0.010 and 0.008).   
   
V. Logrolling and the Network Mechanism 
In this section, we use alumni networks as a setting in which to examine the practice and 
implications of logrolling in the U.S. Senate.  As noted earlier, an advantage of our empirical strategy 
is that we are able to examine the practice of logrolling by exploiting situations where network 
mechanisms are likely to be more utilized, while the characteristics of the network itself remain 
constant.  
We start to examine vote trading by focusing on: i.) votes that are "irrelevant" to those firms 
                                                 
15 Appendix Table A6 shows this basic result, using both the percentage and the sum measure, for the U.S. House of 
Representatives as well. 
16 The percentage of regression observations (out of 671,520 total Senators’ votes from Table I) that have at least one 
other Senator voting on the bill who is connected to the given Senator through either: (i) same school, (ii) same school and 
degree, or (iii) same school, degree, and year, are 65.8%, 52.6%, and 37.3%, respectively.  Additionally, Table A3 contains 
more detailed information on the composition of each of the networks in terms of political affiliation, religion, and 
geographic location.  Tables A4 and A5 then show the top 20 schools and top 20 Senators, ranked by their propensity to 
vote with the school network.  
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located in a Senator’s home state, and ii.) votes that are close to passing (or failing to pass).  The idea 
behind this approach is that these are times when the supply of votes that can be swayed by peers is 
high (irrelevant votes to some Senators in the network), and the demand by peers to sway them is also 
high (votes close to passing).  Thus, these are the exact times that members would be expected to 
exert the most pressure on fellow Senators (Stratmann (1992)).
17  We then further explore (in Section 
V.A) a very strict test controlling for the possibility of heterogeneous effects of fixed network 
characteristics across votes. 
  Our approach helps to rule out an alternative explanation for the alumni network findings that 
is based on a common characteristic of the network causing voting behavior to be related, rather than 
the direct effect of the network itself causing voting behavior to be related.  For example, perhaps 
instead of Georgetown Senators using their Georgetown network to curry the votes they need to pass 
a bill, it might be that Georgetown Senators are related to each other in some unobservable way.  This 
relation could come from common experiences at Georgetown, but need not, and could be any 
common characteristic that they share (correlated with both attending Georgetown, as opposed to 
another university).  By varying the times when network impact is likely to be strongest, we can 
directly evaluate this alternative explanation.  If our results are simply due to a common, unobserved 
characteristic, the characteristic and its predicted impact on Georgetown Senators’ voting should 
impact all Georgetown Senators in the same manner across votes (as it is, by definition, a common 
characteristic across the network).  However, if our effects are driven by Senators using their alumni 
networks to curry votes to help pass a bill, we can identify the exact times, and the exact Senators, 
within a given network, that will be impacted differentially from all other network agents, in an ex-ante 
predictable way. 
  To identify "irrelevant" votes for a Senator, we first use the bill classification system explained 
in Section II to classify each bill as being related to certain industries, depending upon the text of the 
bill.  For the given bill, we then check whether any of the industries the bill addresses have operations 
in each Senator’s state.
18  Thus, for each bill and Senator, we classify whether the bill is relevant for 
the given Senator by whether it covers industries that have operations in the Senator’s state.  In other 
words, we expect those bills addressing matters of relevance to firms in the Senator’s state to be the 
bills that the Senator will have a vested interest in voting either for or against.  We then examine the 
                                                 
17 See also Duggan and Levitt (2002) for evidence of payment-in-kind behavior in sumo wrestling, where the incentive 
structure of promotion in the sport leads to gains from trade between different wrestler types. 
18 Here we identify operations as any public firms domiciled in the state.   
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complement of this set of bills for each Senator.  The complement of this set should represent those bills 
that the Senator has less of an interest (on average) in voting in one direction or the other, since these 
bills are essentially unrelated to any industries represented in his or her home state.  Thus, it should be 
exactly these "irrelevant," uninterested votes for the Senator on which her network should have the 
most persuasive ability (relative to those bills in which the Senator herself has a direct interest).   
  Similarly, for a second measure, we define all votes that are close to passing or failing.  Here, 
we use all votes that are within a close distance of 60 yeas.  The reason we use a window around 60 
votes is that in modern-day Congress the practice of filibustering, or the credible threat of 
filibustering, is enough to defeat votes that cannot meet the 60-vote threshold needed to avoid a 
filibuster.
19  We do not center our "close" measure around 50 votes, since votes with say 40 yea votes 
would not need any filibustering, because the idea of a filibuster is to prevent a vote from coming to 
the floor (i.e., to block a vote that was likely to pass), and votes with this magnitude of support are 
almost never brought to the floor for a vote, given their unlikely chance of passage. 
  The idea behind exploring close votes is that these are the exact votes where the marginal 
value of a vote is especially high, so that Senators might be expected to utilize a mechanism of 
influence to secure these votes.  Thus, this may be a time of especially high exerted influence through 
the network channel.  However, and most importantly, for both the close and the irrelevant measures 
the underlying characteristics of the network remain constant, and thus a common unobservable 
characteristic explanation predicts no change in network impact across network agents.   
  Table IV presents the results of these tests.  The dependent variable is again the vote of each 
Senator, Yes.  The first variable of interest is Close, measured three distinct ways, as a categorical 
variable equal to 1 for those votes that are either (3%), (5%), or (7%) from 60% yeas, and 0 
otherwise.  We then interact this variable with School Connected Votes (SCV), measured as the 
percentage of the other Senators in the given Senator’s alumni network voting yes for the given vote 
on the given bill.  This interaction term measures the increased impact of networks on voting 
behavior for the Close votes.  The next variable of interest is Irrelevant To Me, measured as a categorical 
variable equal to 1 if the given bill does not address any industries (and hence firms) domiciled in the 
Senator’s state, and 0 otherwise.  The same controls from Table III are included in every specification.  
Finally, because the Close measure is identified at the vote level, and identifies a subset of all votes, we 
cannot include Congress-session-vote fixed effects in these regressions (as the close variable would be 
                                                 
19 See Beth and Heitshusen (2012) for details and rules regarding the practice of filibustering in the U.S. Senate.  
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a linear combination of a subset of these fixed effects).  Therefore we instead include both Congress 
and Senator fixed effects in all regression specifications, and continue to adjust standard errors for 
clustering at the Senator level. 
  Columns 1-3 of Table IV show the differing impact of alumni networks for close vs. non-
close votes.  Columns 1 and 2 estimate separate regressions for each set of votes (close and non-
close), while Column 3 estimates a single specification with the interaction term of Close and School 
Connected Votes (denoted Close*SCV in the table).  All three give the same implication: alumni networks 
exert significantly more influence over voting behavior when they are expected to be more utilized, 
namely in close votes.  From the interaction term in Column 3 (0.035 (t=3.28)), the effect of networks 
nearly doubles at times of close votes.  Column 4 then confirms a similar result using a slightly more 
moderate measure of Close ((5%) as opposed to (3%)).  Column 5 then does the same for the 
(7%) range.  The differential impact of networks is still significant for (7%), but is monotonically 
decreasing in point estimate from (3%) to (7%), as we would predict given that these we are 
decreasing in the level of closeness of the overall vote, and thus the marginal value of a given vote. 
  Columns 6-8 examine the differing impact of networks on votes that are irrelevant vs. relevant 
to the Senator who is voting.  These columns suggest that networks have a greater influence over 
voting behavior when the bills being voted on are not relevant to the given Senator (again where 
relevance is defined as pertinent to industries represented in one’s home state).  Comparing the 
coefficients on School Connected Votes in Columns 6 and 7 (and examining the interaction term in 
Column 8), the impact of networks on voting behavior is over 50% as large when a vote is not 
relevant to the given Senator.
20   
  Column 8 of Table IV combines these close and irrelevant measures to examine the effect of 
school networks at times when the vote is both a close vote and not pertinent to the Senator who is 
voting.  The interaction term from Column 8 (0.060 (t=2.20)) implies that at these times, the network 
has an impact over 3 times larger than for all other votes.    
 
 
                                                 
20 These regressions only include votes on bills for which we can ascertain that at least one industry is affected by the bill, 
and hence that the bill is relevant to at least one Senator.  We have also run all of the tests in Columns 6-10 on all bills, 
where we designate bills that we cannot confidently assign to at least one industry as being "irrelevant" to all Senators, and 
the results are very similar to those presented here.  In fact, the coefficient on the interaction term on (Irrelevant 
Votes*SCV), the analog of Column 8 in Table IV, is significant in this sample, 0.023 (t=2.56).  We prefer the sample in 
which we can confidently assign all bills to sets of industries.  
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V.A.  Isolating the Network Mechanism 
  A remaining potential concern is that even though we show network impact is strongest 
precisely when there is: i.) the most demand to sway votes, and ii.) the most willing supply, there could 
still be a common characteristic that has varying impacts across votes.  To be more specific, it is not 
implausible that there could be heterogeneous effects of the static network characteristic across 
votes.
21  Further, with respect to irrelevant votes, it may be exactly when a vote is otherwise irrelevant 
to a Senator that you observe her relying more on intrinsic preferences, which could be correlated 
across the network, and thus the correlation with the mean network vote will be higher in these cases 
(giving the results in Columns 6-8 of Table IV).   
  In order to try to rule out the possibility of a varying impact of a fixed characteristic, we 
construct new measures in order to yield the sharpest estimate of the network impact on voting.  
Specifically, we create a new variable called School Connected Votes Relevant (SCVR), which is the 
percentage of school friends for whom the bill is a "relevant" bill (i.e., who have a firm in that 
industry operating in their state) who vote yes on that bill.  This variable is a subset of the School 
Connected Votes (defined as the percentage of all school  friends who vote yes on the given bill), 
however an especially informative one.  The idea behind separating out these votes is that out of all 
the school friends voting on the bill, these are those that have an active vested interest in obtaining a 
certain outcome of the vote.  For all other of the school friends, the vote is irrelevant, and thus they 
have no interest in swaying votes.   
  This is where the sharp contrast arises in predictions between the explanations of a correlated 
characteristic (with heterogeneous impacts), and the direct impact of influencing votes through the 
network.  If it were simply an underlying, correlated network characteristic, this characteristic should 
be expressed more prevalently by the group of Senators in the network for whom the given vote is 
irrelevant, as they have (on average) no other interests clouding their voting, and so their expressed 
vote is a better measure of the correlated network characteristic on the given vote.  Thus, the vote of 
this group should be more correlated with the given Senator’s vote, while the corresponding vote of 
the SCVR (those school connected Senators for whom the vote is relevant) should be less related.  In 
contrast, if it is the direct influence channel driving these results, then the Senator’s vote should be 
more correlated with the SCVR, as it is precisely these Senators that have an interest in currying votes 
                                                 
21 For instance, Snyder and Groseclose (2000) show that the impact of party on voting behavior (a fixed characteristic, just 
as network is), varies over time and votes.  
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in their favor.  The Senators with no vested interest in the bill, by contrast, will have no reason to 
exert influence on the Senator for the given bill. 
  We perform exactly this test between the two potential explanations in Columns 1-3 of Table 
V.  In Column 1, we find that all of the school effect is indeed driven by the SCVR, School Connected 
Votes Relevant.  Including this measure in the regression, its coefficient is large and significant, while 
the coefficient on School Connected Votes (SCV), which now measures the impact of those school 
connected votes for whom the given bill is irrelevant, is small and insignificant.
22  This evidence is in 
line with the predictions of the mechanism of direct influence through the network, while it is 
opposite to what is predicted by the mechanism of a heterogeneous impact of a common 
characteristic. 
  Column 2 offers an even sharper test of the network influence channel.  It replicates Column 
9, but solely on the sample of votes that are irrelevant to the Senator who is voting.  The findings are 
similar to Column 1, with the point estimate on SCVR even larger; again the votes of all Senators in 
the network for whom the vote is irrelevant has no reliable impact on the Senator’s voting behavior.   
  Column 3 then offers the sharpest test of the network influence channel by examining the 
effect of school ties (and specifically, the votes within one’s network for whom the bill is relevant, i.e. 
School Connected Votes Relevant (SCVR)) at times when the vote is both a close vote and not pertinent to 
the Senator who is voting.  These are times when demand to influence voting is high (since the vote is 
close), willingness to supply the vote is high (since the vote is irrelevant to the Senator who is voting), 
and where the school effect has been refined to capture solely the yes votes of the network members 
for whom the bill is relevant.  Column 3 indicates that these are precisely the times when network 
influence is strongest: the interaction term in Column 3 (Close & Irrelevant To Me * SCVR) is large and 
significant (.097, t=2.47), and the magnitude of this coefficient implies that network effects at these 
times are over 6 times larger than for all other votes.   
  In fact, the estimate from Column 3 implies that controlling for the Senator’s own tendency to 
approve legislation, the party’s views on the given bill, and the state-implied importance level of the 
given bill, a one standard deviation increase in the percent of the Senator’s network who have a vested 
interest in the bill and vote yes (SCVR) results in a roughly 5 percentage point increase in the 
                                                 
22 For brevity of exposition, (since we already use SCV in all previous specifications) we report the coefficients for SCV 
and SCVR. We could have equivalently (containing the same information), explicitly split the network votes into SCVR, 
and SCVnotR (i.e., School Connected Votes Not-Relevant).  This leads to identical conclusions.  For instance, if we 
replicate Column 1 but explicitly splitting the network into the two components, the coefficient on SCVnotR is -0.021 (t=-
1.67), while that on SCVR is again large, positive, and significant, at .049 (t=2.16).  
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Senator’s likelihood to vote yes.  To gain a better sense of what this magnitude means, consider it 
relative to the effect of state-level considerations.  After the overall party agenda, this is arguably the 
largest determinant of what is expected to drive a Congressman’s voting behavior.  Comparing to a 
one standard deviation in state-level movement,
23 the alumni network effect is roughly 57% the size of 
the state effect.   
  In sum, these results on both close and irrelevant votes, as well as the impact of votes that are 
especially relevant to the members of one’s network, suggest that school ties have an influence on a 
Senator’s voting behavior though direct network effects.  In contrast, these results are inconsistent 
with the alumni network results we find simply capturing some common characteristic.  More 
importantly, the tests of Columns 1-3 in Table V are inconsistent with heterogeneous impacts of a 
fixed characteristic driving our results.  
 
V.B.  The Impact of Powerful Senators within a Network 
    In this section we employ additional network-specific analyses to further flesh out the 
mechanism at work in these Congressional alumni networks.  For example, if a Senator’s goal is to try 
to pass legislation in his or her self-interest and then trade votes as necessary to accomplish this task, 
one implication is that more powerful Senators within a network may be particularly useful in 
marshaling additional support for a bill.  Specifically, the voting of powerful Senators might have a 
large impact on less powerful Senators within a given network, while the converse (i.e., that non-
powerful Senators’ voting impacts powerful Senators) might not be true.  To test this idea, we build 
on a large political science literature that documents the impact and importance of various types of 
Senate committees, and classify Senators as “powerful” based on the particular committees they sit 
on.  We use data on congressional committees from Stewart and Woon (2009) and Nelson (2005).  
We first classify whether any given Senator is on a given committee (i.e., Appropriations Committee) 
in every year of the sample.  We then link this to our school-tie data, and measure how many 
members of each Senator’s school-tied network sit on each given committee.  We use the list of the 
top 10 most influential committees from Edwards and Stewart (2006); for the Senate these 
                                                 
23 While we realize that the state-level percentage measure for the Senate can only by 0 as 1, we still use the standard 
deviation of the measure here in order to get a measure that is standardized and comparable to that of the school network-
level measure.  
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committees are Finance, Veterans Affairs, Appropriations, Rules, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, 
Intelligence, Judiciary, Budget, and Commerce.
24   
This approach allows us to break up each school network into powerful and non-powerful 
Senators (for example Top 3 committee network members versus non-Top 3 committee network 
members), and then test the impact of powerful network members on the voting behavior of non-
powerful network members.  Columns 4 and 5 of Table V show that if we focus on the votes of all 
non-Top 3 Senators, the impact of powerful network members (School Connected Votes Top 3) is large 
and significant (coefficient=0.042, t=3.26), while the impact of non-powerful network members is 
essentially zero.  Meanwhile in unreported results we find that the converse is not true; focusing on 
the votes of powerful members within a network, we still find a large and significant impact of 
powerful network members on the votes of other powerful members, and a small and insignificant 
impact of non-powerful members.
25  These findings suggest that powerful Senators are indeed an 
important part of the logrolling process within a network; in order to marshal support for a bill, it is 
the votes of key members within a network that are critical.
26         
 
VI. Network Ties and Pork Barrel Spending 
In this section, we examine another potential benefit of being in a logrolling network with 
school-tied friends: namely, in securing discretionary funding for your state.  In particular, we examine 
whether the school-tie networks we examine, and friends a Senator trades votes with, can also help 
secure discretionary earmark funding for the Senator’s state. 
  We collect congressional earmark data from Citizens Against Government Waste, which 
collects earmark data by state starting in 1991. An earmark is defined as a line item in an 
appropriations bill that designates tax dollars for a specific purpose in circumvention of established 
budgetary procedures.
27  As in Section V.B, we use data on congressional committee membership, and 
again utilize the rankings of how influential each committee is from Edwards and Stewart (2006).  
                                                 
24 See also Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2011) for a similar categorization. 
25 We have also run these tests with Top 5 versus non-Top 5 members, and Top 10 versus non-Top 10 members and the 
results are very similar. 
26 In unreported tests, we have also explored the potential costs of deviating from network objectives.  Grouping all 
Senators within each network into those who conform versus those who deviate, we find evidence that deviation is costly.  
We find that by failing to be swayed oneself by the network, deviants are then unable to sway others, even in situations 
where those others are generally easily swayed (e.g., in situations where those other network members might be voting on 
an issue that is irrelevant to them and hence would normally be willing to trade their vote). 
27 The data collection, matching, and cleaning procedure are described in detail in Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2011).  
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  The dependent variable in our tests is total earmarks to a given state in a given year.  The 
independent variables of interest are a Senator’s committee membership (On Top Committee) and 
the committee membership of a Senator’s network (Friends on Committee).  We examine 
membership on the Appropriations Committee (as this committee has broad power on appropriations 
line items), as well as Top 3, Top 5 and Top 10 committee memberships.  We also include controls 
for state-level population, per capita income, per-capita income growth, and unemployment.  In 
addition, we cluster standard errors by state, to correct for correlations of earmark allocations over 
time within the same state. 
  The results are reported in Table VI.  From Column 2, members on the Appropriations 
Committee get roughly 16.5% (t=4.09) higher earmark spending directed to their states.  The 
coefficient on Friends on Committee implies that a one standard deviation move in school-links to 
the Appropriations Committee results in roughly 4.2% more earmark spending (t=1.72).  Column 4 
implies similar impacts for school links to one of the Top 3 most influential committees.  While 
membership on a Top 3 committee results in a 10.8% increase in earmarks for the Senator’s state, a 
one standard deviation increase in school-links to Top 3 committees increases earmarks by 5.4% 
(t=2.51).  As the influential committee grouping is broadened, while still positive, the effects weaken 
for school-links to (and membership itself on) Top 5 and Top 10 Committees. 
 
VII. Robustness: Controlling for Ideology; Interactions with School Ties; and Regressions by 
School and Senator 
  In Table VII, we include a number of additional controls that have been shown to affect 
voting in the past literature.  The first additional control variable we include is how a given Senator 
votes with respect to other Senators that possess the same political ideology as the Senator in 
question.  We utilize the DW-Nominate measure of ideology, which is widely used in studies of 
Congressional roll-call voting (see Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004), McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 
(1997), McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006), Poole and Rosenthal (1985), (1997), (2007)).  All 
legislators are given a dynamic DW-Nominate score, which places them during each Congress into 
common space coordinates along two dimensions based on their historical voting record; for 
example, one dimension can be interpreted as "liberal/conservative" in the modern era.
28  We take 
                                                 
28 The other dimension, which is less empirically important over our sample period, can be interpreted as the 
Northern/Southern Democrat divide.   
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these two dimensions and split them according to their medians and thereby create four quadrants.  
We label Senators that lie in the same quadrant as having similar ideologies.  We then use a variable 
that is equal to the percentage of these ideologically like-minded Senators that vote in favor of the 
given bill, which we label Ideology Votes.
29 
  We also include the voting of the Religious group to which the given Senator belongs.  From 
Table II, there is large variation in religious affiliation, and the literature has shown evidence of this 
affecting voting patterns (Hibbing and Marsh (1987)).  Religious affiliation is also plausibly related to 
ideology, at least on certain issues.  We create a measure called Religious Votes, which is the percentage 
of those Senators of the same religious group as the given Senator that vote in favor of the bill.  
Finally, we also explore the impact of votes by Senators who sit on the same Senate Committee as the 
Senator in question, and construct a measure analogous to those above called Same Committee Votes.   
  Table VII presents the regression results including these control variables.  The specifications 
are identical to those in Table III, with the dependent variable being the voting of a given Senator on 
a given roll call vote (Yes), controls included for Party Votes and State Votes, and fixed effects for 
Senator and Congress-Session-Vote included.  Table VII shows that the Ideology Votes variable is 
strongly related to a Senator’s voting pattern across all specifications. Including the ideology variable 
has a modest effect on the magnitude of the alumni network effect, but the network effect remains 
strong in significance and magnitude even in the presence of this variable.  Also note that including 
the ideology variable in all the regressions in Table IV, where we explore the impact of networks 
around close and irrelevant votes, has no effect on these results.  Meanwhile the Religious Votes 
variable is a positive but insignificant predictor of voting behavior.  Finally, Columns 3 and 4 show 
that the yes votes of common committee members are negative predictors of yes votes, after 
controlling for school connected votes, party votes, and state votes.  This is explained by the fact that 
we are controlling for party vote here already, and committees are typically organized with half the 
members in one party and half in the other.  The committee variable is thus (after controlling for 
party vote) largely picking up the voting preferences of the opposing party, resulting in the negative 
sign.  Importantly, none of these control variables explain the influence of the alumni networks on 
Senator voting behavior.  We have also included additional controls for voting by groups of similar 
age, Congressional cohort, gender, ethnicity, and geographic region (as measured by Census region), 
                                                 
29 We have experimented with a variety of other specifications for ideology, for example forming quintile (or decile) 
groups based solely on the first DW-Nominate dimension, and our results are unchanged across these different 
specifications.  
Friends in High Places — Page 21 
 
and none of these additional control variables affect the results reported here. 
  Columns 7-9 of Table VII explore interactions of the alumni effect with the control variables 
designed to capture the impact of party, state, and ideological influences on voting.  Consistent with 
the finding in Mian et al (2009) that ideology helps to mitigate pressure from outside groups, we find a 
smaller impact of the alumni network on voting when the intrinsic interest in the vote is stronger.  In 
fact, Columns 7-9 indicate that when an issue is important to one’s party, one’s state, or one’s 
ideological peers, the school effect is significantly smaller (all three interaction terms are negative, and 
significant).  These results lend additional support to our earlier findings that whenever a particular 
vote is inherently important to a Senator who is voting, outside influences on their voting are weaker.    
  Next, in Table VIII we explore a variety of different specifications designed as robustness 
checks for our main findings.  In Columns 1 and 2 we run probit and logit regressions, respectively, 
that include the same explanatory variables as those in Table III.  Specifically, Column 1 is run as a 
probit regression, with the coefficient estimate shown being the implied marginal effect of school ties 
on the probability of voting yes.  Again we see that School Connected Votes is a strong predictor of 
voting behavior in the Senate.  To give an idea of magnitudes, for the probit coefficient from Column 
1 (0.095, t=3.65), a one standard deviation increase in the percent of the Senator’s network voting for 
the bill implies a 3.71% increase in probability of voting yes for the given Senator (compared with a 
2% estimated effect from the OLS estimates from Table III).  Column 2 is run as a logit regression, 
and once again we see a large and significant effect of alumni networks on voting.
30   
  Next in Columns 3-5 we employ a Fama-MacBeth type framework, where the regression 
specifications (with controls and fixed effects) are run at the level of each group indicated separately. 
Then the coefficient estimates are averaged across the groups, with the standard errors calculated as 
the standard error of the individual group coefficients.  For example, in Column 3 we run the 
regressions of the alumni network effect for each school separately; this approach effectively mitigates 
the impact of any single school that may be driving our results, as the reported coefficient is an equal-
weighted average of the school effects across all schools in our sample.  Columns 4 and 5 perform a 
similar procedure, running the regressions separately for every Senator and for every Congress-
Session (i.e., year), respectively.  The reported coefficients are then the equal-weighted average across 
Senators (Column 4) and across years (Column 5).  Columns 4 and 5 thus specifically rule out any 
                                                 
30 We have also replicated Table IV using probit and logit specifications, and as above, the results are in fact slightly larger, 
and strongly significant.  We choose the linear probability model so that we can control more finely for a number of fixed 
effects that can impact voting behavior.   
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particular (or a few) Senators or years from driving the results we find.   
Thus, if our results were driven by a certain subsample, or a small set of subsamples, the 
equally-weighted average of the coefficients across subsamples would look much different in 
magnitude than the pooled regressions (and likely significance, given the then implied differences in 
estimates across subsamples), and so these tests would yield different implications.  Columns 3-5 all 
indicate that running the regressions by school, by Senator, or by Congress-Session has no effect on 
our main conclusions: the alumni network effect we document in this paper is not driven by a 
particular school, or a particular Senator, nor is it concentrated in a particular year.   
  Lastly, we have also performed a variety of additional robustness checks that we do not report 
here in order to conserve space.  For instance, using the full-specification of the last column of Table 
III (including Senator- and vote-level fixed effects), we also include school-level fixed effects to 
control for the propensity of a given school (or any common characteristic correlated with attendance 
at that school) to impact voting (on average) in a specific way.  Including these school fixed effects 
has nearly no impact on our direct measure of the network’s influence on a given Senator’s voting for 
that particular bill.  The coefficient on School Connected Votes on the given bill is 0.052 (t=3.31).
31 
  Taken as a whole, our results demonstrate that the impact of alumni networks on Senate 
voting behavior: a) is robust to a variety of different specifications, b) is not driven by a particular 
school, Senator, or time period, and c) does not appear to be capturing some common characteristic.    
 
VIII. Discussion 
  We lastly step back to ask the larger question of what implications these documented voting 
patterns have for legislators, constituents (both firms and individuals), and perhaps even some 
broader measures of welfare.  First, in terms of legislators, we believe the surprising (and important) 
aspect of these results is how large of a factor networks are in impacting legislator behavior.  What 
amplifies this importance is that the networks appear particularly useful in currying votes on precisely 
those pieces of legislation that are most important to the legislator.  As mentioned earlier in the paper, 
the magnitudes of these network effects are roughly 60% of the state-level considerations.  We believe 
the magnitude of these network effects have not been fully appreciated in the literature, nor by 
                                                 
31 In addition, we have run all regressions on the sample of only measures (the final versions of the bills voted on in the 
chamber), we have included total network size in all of these regressions, and we have included squared or cubed versions 
of the control variables Party Votes, State Votes, and Ideology Votes (in order to test if the alumni effect is simply capturing a 
non-linear effect of one of these control variables).  In all cases, School Connected Votes remains large and significant.  
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legislators’ constituents, as they simply have not been quantified in as systematic a fashion as we do 
here both across the legislative process and over many decades.  
Second, in terms of constituents, first considering individuals, we believe voters would be 
quite surprised to find exactly how large an effect these networks have on their elected officials’ 
voting behavior.  Perhaps more importantly, they would likely be interested to know exactly how 
helpful these networks can be in terms of currying the specific votes on which they (and thus their 
legislator) have a large vested interest.  Thus, thinking about the networks to which these voters’ 
elected official has access should potentially be a non-trivial aspect of any voter’s decision, especially 
as these networks appear most useful precisely when the issue appears to be most welfare-increasing 
to the voters as constituents (i.e., helps the most important industries in the state in terms of 
employees, revenues, etc.).  For firms, as the legislation directly impacts them, their industries, and 
their competitive environments, we expect the firms to be interested in the ability to access richer 
legislative networks to impact legislation most important to them.  
Lastly, we can also consider the implications of our results for broader measures of welfare. 
However, this issue is not straightforward.  While it is certainly true that state level constituents would 
benefit from their congressmen currying votes from the Congressman’s networks at times that are 
most crucial, the impact on other states is also important.  We provide evidence that the members 
within the network that supply their votes are those who have the least interest in the outcome of the 
votes.  While this net transfer would seem positive within the network, the net effects outside the 
network are harder to quantify.  In other words, say that Congress is voting on legislation to build 
plants in Massachusetts instead of in the neighboring states of New Hampshire or Rhode Island.  The 
Massachusetts Congressmen can use their networks, say in California to vote in favor of the bill, and 
potentially pass it.  While this is positive for Massachusetts, and has nearly no impact on California, it 
obviously has a negative impact for the constituents of New Hampshire and Rhode Island.  We would 
need to add up all of these spillovers, some of which are subtle and difficult to quantify, in order to 
get a measure of the total social welfare implications.  Thus, the net effects of these networks are 
unclear.  On the other hand, it appears that the networks provide one way for votes to have some 
notion of a “market price,” (even if that is a constrained market to within-network), as votes are 
traded based on private valuations within the network.  If legislators are acting in constituents best 
interests, it may be welfare-increasing for them to sell a vote on an issue that their constituents do not 
care about for reciprocal votes on issues that have large welfare implications for their constituents.  If 
the networks allow for these market trades to take place in a less costly way, it may be a better state of  
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the world than if no market at all (or a more costly market) existed for these votes.  
 
IX. Conclusion 
  In this paper we examine the impact of personal connections on the voting behavior of U.S. 
politicians.  Using a new, hand-collected database that constructs linkages between members of the 
U.S. Congress, we show that social networks influence Senate voting behavior.   
  The network measure we use is based on the alumni networks of Senators.  An advantage of 
these education-based networks is that they are formed decades before the voting behavior we 
attempt to explain.  We show that even after controlling for known voting determinants, a Senator’s 
school network has a large and significant impact on their voting behavior.  Using our sharpest 
measure of direct influence, a one-standard deviation increase in the percentage of a Senator’s 
interested alumni network voting in favor of a bill implies a roughly 5 percentage point increase in the 
Senator’s own likelihood of voting in favor of a bill.  The magnitude of this effect is close to 60% of 
the effect of state-level considerations.  Further, the impact of school ties on voting is monotonically 
increasing with the strength of network, is not driven by a particular school, Senator, or time period, 
and is robust to a variety of different specifications and controls. 
We show that alumni networks offer a unique window into the widespread practice of 
logrolling, or vote trading, in the U.S. Senate.  By exploiting situations where the network mechanisms 
are likely to be more utilized, while the characteristics of the network itself remain constant, we 
demonstrate that the alumni network effect increases significantly at times when the network is 
plausibly the most important, such as for close votes, for votes that are less important to the Senator 
who is voting, and particularly for votes that are both close and irrelevant to the Senator who is voting.  
In addition, we find evidence suggesting that Senators are more likely to logroll with network 
members who are on more powerful Senate committees.  Finally, we examine another potential 
benefit of being in a logrolling network with school-tied friends, and show that having a member of 
one’s alumni network on a powerful Senate committee can help a Senator secure additional 
discretionary earmark funding for his or her own state. 
  As legislators, individuals, and firms all have large stakes in the outcomes of the legislative 
process, our evidence provides important insights into the nature of vote passage in the US legislative 
landscape.  Collectively our findings illustrate the power that informal social networks can have on the 
behavior of lawmakers, and underscore the need for a deeper understanding of the network forces 
that shape individual behavior more generally.  
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Table I: Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the sample.  Yes is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Senator voted "Yes" or "Yea" on a given vote.  
SumSameSchool is equal to the number of Senators (repreSenatives) who attended the same university as the Senator (repreSenative) in 
question, SumYesSameSchool is equal to the number of Senators (Representatives) who attended the same school as the Senator in question 
(Representative), and PctSumYesSameSchool is equal to (SumYesSameSchool/SumSameSchool).  Analogous variables are computed for 
SameSchoolDegree (which requires common attendance at the same university and for the same degree), as well as similar variables for Party, 
State, Religion, Census Region, and Ideology (based on the DW-Nominate coordinates).  CloseSeat4 is a measure of Senate Chamber Seat 
Distance from one Senator to another (see Table VII).  Top 40 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Senator went to a Top 40 university as 
ranked by the U.S. News and World Report, and Important Vote is equal to 1 if the given vote is important to that Senator (see Table A2).      
  101st-110th Congresses (1989-2008), Senators = 209 
  Mean Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Nonmissing 
Observations 
Yes  0.653 1.00 0.476 651,705
SumSameSchool 3.952 1.00 5.937 671,520
SumYesSameSchool  2.528 1.00 4.258 671,520
PctSumYesSameSchool 0.638 0.75 0.389 441,746
SumSameSchoolDegree  2.074 1.00 3.275 671,520
SumYesSameSchoolDegree  1.327 0.00 2.354 671,520
PctSumYesSameSchoolDegree 0.639 0.75 0.393 353,063
SumYesSameParty 31.139 39.00 18.668  671,520
PctSumYesSameParty 0.633 0.82 0.369 668,438
SumYesSameState  0.633 1.00 0.481 671,520
PctSumYesSameState 0.634 1.00 0.482 671,240
SumYesSameIdeology 16.365 17.00 10.675  671,520
PctSumYesSameIdeology 0.633 0.81 0.370 670,839
SumCloseSeat4  10.616 11.00 2.850 668,534
SumYesCloseSeat4  6.745 7.00 4.546 668,534
PctSumYesCloseSeat4  0.633 0.80 0.376 668,534
SumYesCloseSeat8  15.782 17.00 9.404 668,534
PctSumYesCloseSeat8  0.633 0.78 0.353 668,534
SumYesCloseSeat16  33.482 36.00 17.533 668,534
PctSumYesCloseSeat16 0.634 0.72 0.318 668,534
SumYesSameCensusRegion 6.743 6.00 3.955 671,520
PctSumYesSameCensusRegion 0.634 0.67 0.289 671,520
SumYesSameReligion  5.954 5.00 5.721 671,520
PctSumYesSameReligion 0.634 0.67 0.302 573,853
Measure 0.256 0.00 0.437 671,520
Top 40 School  0.423 0.00 0.494 671,520
Important Vote  0.080 0.00 0.271 671,520
   
    
 
 
 
 
Table II: Academic Institutions and Religions Represented in the U.S. Senate (101st-110th Congresses) 
 
 
This table shows summary statistics of the academic institutions and religions that are most represented in the 101st-110th Congresses of the Senate.  Each of the 209 
Senators that served in the Senate over this period is included once in these tabulations, but Senators often have degrees from more than one academic institution, hence 
the total number of degrees exceeds the total number of Senators.  Religion information is unavailable for 42 of the 209 Senators. 
 
 
  Panel A: Schools Represented in the Senate  Panel B: Religions Represented in the Senate 
Rank  Academic institution  # of degrees % of total Rank Religion  # of Senators % of total
1  Harvard University  35  9.33  1  Roman Catholic  38  22.75 
2  Yale University 23 6.13  2  Methodist  25  14.97 
3  University of Virginia  10  2.67 3  Presbyterian  22  13.17 
4T  Stanford  University  8 2.13  4  Episcopalian  17 10.18 
4T Georgetown  University  8  2.13  5T  Jewish 16  9.58 
6T  Oxford  University  7 1.87  5T  Baptist  16 9.58 
6T  Vanderbilt University 7  1.87  7  Lutheran  7  4.19 
6T  University of Chicago  7  1.87  8  Congregationalist  6  3.59 
9T Princeton  University  6  1.60  9  Mormon  5  2.99 
9T  University of Georgia  6  1.60  10  United Church of Christ  4  2.40 
9T  University of Alabama  6  1.60         
9T  University of Mississippi  6  1.60         
9T  University of Minnesota  6  1.60         
              
All Degrees    375  100  All   167  100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table III: The Impact of School Ties on U.S. Senate Voting Behavior 
 
This table reports panel regressions of individual votes on the voting behavior of different Senate groupings.  The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the Senator voted "Yea," and zero otherwise.  
In Columns 1-2, School Connected Votes is the percentage of Senators from the same school as the Senator in question who voted yes on the given bill. In Columns 5-7, School Connected 
Votes is the sum of Senators from the same school as the Senator in question who voted yes on the given bill; School Connected Votes (School and Degree) is the sum of Senators from the 
same school (and who received the same degree) as the Senator in question who voted yes on the given bill; and School Connected Votes (School, Degree, and Year) is the sum of Senators from 
the same school (and who received the same degree and who were born within 3 years of each other) as the Senator in question who voted yes on the given bill.  State Votes is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the Senators from the same state as the Senator in question voted yes on the given bill.  Party Votes is the percentage (in Columns 1-2), or sum (in Columns 3-5), of Senators from 
the same party as the Senator in question who voted yes on the given bill. Congress fixed effects, Congress-Session-Vote (C-S-Vote) fixed effects, and Senator-fixed effects are included where 
indicated.  All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the Senator-level, and these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  ***Significant at 
1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Vote(Yes/No)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Measure of Connections Percentage Percentage Sum Sum Sum
 
School Connected   0.045*** 0.052*** 0.008*** 
Votes  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.002]     
School Connected Votes 0.010***
(School and Degree)        [0.004]   
School Connected Votes 0.020**
(School, Degree, and Year)          [0.008] 
State Votes  0.119*** 0.122*** 0.144***  0.144*** 0.144***
  [0.013]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012] 
Party Votes  0.926*** 0.945*** 0.018***  0.018*** 0.018***
  [0.022]  [0.024]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
 
Fixed Effects  Congress C-S-Vote C-S-Vote C-S-Vote C-S-Vote
Fixed Effects  Senator Senator Senator  Senator Senator
Adjusted R2  0.64 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.62
No. of Obs.  425653 425653 651705  651705 651705 
 
 
Table IV: Logrolling Through Alumni Networks 
 
This table reports panel regressions of individual U.S. Senator votes on the voting behavior of other Senators.  The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the Senator voted "Yea," and zero 
otherwise.  The sample of votes examined is indicated in each column: i.) Close Votes are all votes that are functionally won or lost by (3) or (5) or (7) votes as indicated (described in Section 
V), ii.) Non-Close Votes are the complements to these votes, iii.) Relevant To Me are those votes where the given bill addresses an industry that has public firms operating in the voting Senator’s 
home state, iv.) Irrelevant To Me are those votes that don’t address any public firms operating in the given voting Senator’s home state, and v.) All include all votes in the sample.  The independent 
variables of Close Votes, Irrelevant Votes, and Close & Irrelevant To Me, are defined as categorical variables equal to 1 if the given vote being considered corresponds to the respective classification (as 
described above in i-iv), and is equal to 0 for all other votes.  Interaction terms are then constructed between these three categorical variables and School Connected Votes (SCV), which is the 
percentage of Senators from the same school as the Senator in question who voted yes on the given bill.  The controls of Party Votes and State Votes are included in all regressions (as indicated) 
and are described in Table III.  Both Senator fixed effects and Congress-Session (Cong-Sess) fixed effects are included where indicated.  All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 
Senator level, and these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  Significance levels are denoted by: *** for the 1%; ** for the 5%; and * for the 10% 
level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Votes Sample:  Non-Close  Close  All  All  All  Relevant  Irrelevant  All  All 
            To Me  To Me     
Measure:  (3)  (3)  (3)  (5)  (7)        (5) 
                   
School Connected Votes (SCV)  0.043***  0.068***  0.041**  0.040**  0.039**  0.029**  0.052**  0.030**  0.026* 
  [0.016]  [0.021]  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.015]  [0.026]  [0.011]  [0.014] 
Close * SCV      0.035***  0.027***  0.021**         
      [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.010]         
IrrelevantToMe  * SCV                0.017   
                [0.011]   
Close & IrrelevantToMe * SCV                  0.060** 
                  [0.027] 
Close Votes      -0.019*  -0.013  -0.008         
      [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.010]         
IrrelevantToMe              -0.022   
              [2.19]   
Close & IrrelevantToMe                -0.028 
                [0.021] 
Controls  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed  Effects  Cong-Sess Cong-Sess  Cong-Sess  Cong-Sess  Cong-Sess Cong-Sess  Cong-Sess  Cong-Sess  Cong-Sess 
Fixed Effects  Senator  Senator  Senator  Senator Senator  Senator  Senator  Senator  Senator 
Adjusted R2  0.66 0.54  0.64  0.64  0.64 0.59  0.60  0.59  0.59 
No. of Obs.  382894  42759  425653  425653  425653  54075  15559  69634  49551  
 
 
Table V: Isolating the Network Mechanism 
 
This table reports panel regressions of individual U.S. Senator votes on the voting behavior of other Senators.  The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the 
Senator voted "Yea," and zero otherwise.  The sample of votes examined is indicated in each column: i.) All include all votes in the sample, ii.) Irrelevant To 
Me are those votes that don’t address any public firms operating in the given voting Senator’s home state, iii.) Not Top 3 includes the subset of all votes made 
only by Senators who are not members of one of the “Top 3” most powerful committees (Finance, Veterans Affairs, and Appropriations).  The 
independent variables of Close Votes, Irrelevant Votes, and Close & Irrelevant To Me, are defined as categorical variables equal to 1 if the given vote being 
considered corresponds to the respective classification (as described above in i-iii), and is equal to 0 for all other votes.  School Connected Votes Top 3 equals the 
percentage of Senators from the same school as the Senator in question and who are members of a Top 3 committee, who voted yes on the given bill.  The 
controls of Party Votes and State Votes are included in all regressions and are described in Table III.  Both Senator fixed effects and Congress-Session (Cong-
Sess) fixed effects are included where indicated.  All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the Senator level, and these clustered standard errors are 
included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  Significance levels are denoted by: *** for the 1%; ** for the 5%; and * for the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
Votes Sample:  All  Irrelevant 
To Me 
All  Not Top 3  Not Top 3 
           
           
           
School Connected Votes (SCV)  -0.014  -0.022  0.011     
  [0.024]  [0.046]  [0.032]         
School Connected Votes Relevant (SCVR)  0.044** 0.056**  0.016     
  [0.021]  [0.025]  [0.032]         
           
Close & IrrelevantToMe * SCVR       0.097***    
      [0.039]         
               
School Connected Top 3        0.042***   
          [0.018]     
           
School Connected Not Top 3          -0.009 
            [0.017]   
               
                
Adjusted R2  0.59 0.56 0.59    0.67  0.66   
No. of Obs.  60557  8538  46823    178265  161316    
 
 
Table VI: Network Ties and Pork Barrel Spending 
 
This table reports panel regressions of earmarks on Senate committee membership, and membership of network connected friends.  The dependent variable 
is ln(state-level annual earmarks).  On Appropriations Committee (On Top 3, 5, or 10 Committee) is a categorical variable equal to one if the Senator is a 
member of the given committee (or set of top committees), and zero otherwise.  Friends on Committee is the percentage of the given committee that is 
school network-connected to the given Senator.  Control variables include ln(state-level population), the state-level average of ln(per capita income) over the 
past 6 years, and lagged values of state-level ln(per-capita income growth) and state-level unemployment rates.  Year-fixed effects and state-fixed effects are 
included in all regressions.  All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level, and t-stats using these clustered standard errors are included in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  Significance levels are denoted by: *** for the 1%; ** for the 5%; and * for the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)
                 
On Appropriations Committee  0.159*** 0.165***          
  [0.041]  [0.040]             
On Top 3 Committee    0.098*** 0.108***      
      [0.034]  [0.033]         
On Top 5 Committee    0.049 0.051     
          [0.040]  [0.040]     
On Top 10 Committee      -0.007  -0.009
              [0.054]  [0.056] 
Friends on Committee  0.083* 0.085* 0.098** 0.109** 0.019 0.018  0.011  0.007
  [0.048]  [0.049]  [0.040]  [0.043]  [0.043]  [0.044]  [0.044]  [0.046] 
                 
                 
Controls  No Yes No Yes No Yes  No  Yes
Fixed Effects  State  State State State State State State  State
Fixed Effects  Year  Year Year Year Year Year  Year  Year
Adjusted R2  0.77 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.76  0.75
No. of Obs.  1788  1688 1788 1688 1788 1688  1788  1688 
 
 
Table VII: Controlling for the Impact of Ideology and Interactions with School Ties 
 
This table reports panel regressions of individual Senate votes on the voting behavior of different Senate groupings.  The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the Senator voted "Yea," and zero 
otherwise.  School Connected Votes (SCV) is the percentage of Senators from the same school as the Senator in question who voted yes on the given bill.  Religious Votes is the percentage of 
Senators of the same religious affiliation as the Senator in question who voted yes on the given bill.  Ideology Votes (DW-Nominate) is the percentage of Senators in the same DW-Nominate 
Ideology quadrant as the Senator in question who voted yes on the given bill.  Same Committee Votes is the percentage of Senators on the same committee as the Senator in question who voted 
yes on the given bill.  The controls of Party Votes and State Votes are included in all regressions (as indicated) and are described in Table III.  We also include interactions of School Connected 
Votes (SCV) and the control variables Party Votes, State Votes, and Ideology Votes where indicated.  Congress-Session-Vote (C-S-Vote) fixed effects and Senator-fixed effects are included 
where indicated.  All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the Senator level, and these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  ***Significant 
at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
 
School Connected Votes (SCV)  0.051*** 0.040*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.038***  0.037*** 0.074*** 0.051*** 0.074***
  [0.017]  [0.013]  [0.017]  [0.018]  [0.013]  [0.014]  [0.016]  [0.014]  [0.015] 
Religious Votes  0.041 0.035 0.022  0.013
  [0.031]  [0.035]  [0.022]  [0.024]       
Ideology Votes  0.409*** 0.397***  0.398*** 0.407*** 0.408*** 0.441***
(DW-Nominate)    [0.035]      [0.039]  [0.039]  [0.035]  [0.035]  [0.035] 
Same Committee Votes  -0.337*** -0.341** -0.347***
      [0.070]  [0.080]    [0.075]       
SCV * Party Votes  -0.064***
        [ 0 . 0 1 3 ]     
SCV * State Votes  -0.023***
         [ 0 . 0 0 7 ]    
SCV * Ideology Votes  -0.063***
          [ 0 . 0 1 2 ]  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects  C-S-Vote C-S-Vote C-S-Vote C-S-Vote C-S-Vote C-S-Vote C-S-Vote C-S-Vote C-S-Vote
Fixed Effects  Senator Senator Senator Senator Senator  Senator Senator Senator Senator
Adjusted R2  0.64 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.65
No. of Obs.  351202 424991 384143 318745 350540  318314 424991 424991 424991 
 
Table VIII: Alternate School Ties Specifications 
 
This table reports regressions of individual votes on the voting behavior of different Senate groupings.  The dependent variable in all regressions is equal to 
1 if the Senator voted "Yea," and zero otherwise.  Column 1 is run as a Probit regression, with the coefficient estimate shown being the implied marginal 
effect on the probability of voting yes.  Column 2 is run as a Logit regression.  Columns 3-5, are run in a Fama-MacBeth type framework, where the 
regression specifications (with controls and fixed effects) are run at the level of each group indicated separately. Then the coefficient estimates are averaged 
across the groups, with the standard errors calculated as standard error of the group coefficients.  School Connected Votes is the percentage of Senators 
from the same school as the Senator in question who voted yes on the given bill.  Votes that are Close & Irrelevant to Me are defined as those votes that are 
functionally won or lost by (5) votes, and that do not address any public firms operating in the given voting Senator’s home state.  Controls for Party Votes 
and State Votes are included in all regressions, and are described in Table III.  Ideology Votes (DW-Nominate) is the percentage of Senators in the same 
DW-Nominate Ideology quadrant as the Senator in question who voted yes on the given bill.  Congress, Senator, and Congress-Session (Cong-Sess) fixed 
effects are included where indicated.  All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the Senator level, and these clustered standard errors are included in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Vote(Yes/No)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regression Specification  Probit Logit OLS by: OLS by: OLS by: 
 School Senator Congress-Session
  
School Connected Votes (SCV)  0.095*** 0.544*** 0.052*** 0.073*** 0.047*** 
  [0.026]  [0.149]  [0.016]  [0.023]  [0.004] 
   
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects  Congress Congress Senator 
Fixed Effects  Senator  
Adjusted R2  0.59 0.58  
No. of Obs.  425653 425653   106 156 20  
 
 
Figure 1: Congressional Bill Industry Assignment Example 
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In this Appendix we describe in more detail the method and data cut-offs we use to classify bills into 
industries.  We also describe additional variations in vote samples that we have explored.   
  
A.1  Industry Classification, Keywords, and Cut-offs   
As described in the data section, we first download the full text of all bills jointly from the Government 
Printing Office (GPO) and Congress’s Thomas database.  We then parse each bill’s entire text, and use a list of 
matching words to classify each bill into the industries to which it applies.  Table A1 displays the words we use 
to classify into the Fama-French 49 industries, for three sample industries.  We are happy to provide the entire 
list upon request, for all 49 industries (but including them all in the appendix table made this a 13 page table).  
Again, the Fama-French 49 industries are somewhat analogous to the SIC 2 digit industry classification, with 
some improvements and aggregations of similar SIC 2 sub-industry components.  As Table A1 shows, we 
obviously attempt to use a number of keywords to capture the bill’s relevance to a given industry.  However, 
we balance this by not choosing too many keywords to induce false positives.  In the table, we include when a 
given industry (or keyword) was removed because it was capturing too many false positives in the industry 
assignment process.   
To give a few examples, we remove the word “soda” from the “Candy and Soda” industry, as it kept 
matching with “soda ash” and “soda mountain” from a number of bills, both having nothing to do with the 
desired industry.  As another example, for the “Personal Services Industry,” we initially included the keyword 
“beauty shop.”  Unfortunately, nearly all of the instances of this keyword in bills refer to the “House Beauty 
Shop,” referencing a (debate about) and the eventual closing of this service in one of the House of 
Representative buildings, and so we remove this keyword as well.  
Another important aspect of this table is that after deciding upon keyword roots, we then go through 
each extension and conjugation that we see in the bills in order to determine which extensions and 
conjugations reasonably refer to the given industry.  So, for instance, for the “Utilities” industry, we use the 
keyword root “utilit-.”  While this matches correctly “utility” and “utilities,” it incorrectly picks up “utilize” and 
“utilitarian,” which also appear in bills.  We thus remove all of the final two matches from the bill matched 
sample to Utilities through “utilit-.”  We do this for every keyword root in every industry to ensure that the 
given keyword root matches to the intended industry.   
  The last element of the process is then choosing threshold frequencies for each keyword appearing in a 
given bill relative to that keyword’s use across all bills, in order to classify a given bill as referring to that 
keyword’s industry.  We use two potential methods for this, the first is the absolute count of the keyword, and 
the second is the ratio of that word to the entire number of words in the bill.  For instance, the word  
 
 
“electricity” has a frequency cut-off of 11 times, representing the 95
th percentile of that keyword’s distribution 
amongst bills.  We have used cut-offs for both measures ranging from the 75
th-95
th percentile, and the results in 
the paper are unaffected. All results reported in the paper are for the middle of this range, 85
th percentile, using 
the absolute number of keyword appearances.   
The outcome of this process is a match of relevant industries to each bill considered in congress.  We 
believe we have a quite conservative match process, but match fairly definitively 20% of all bills to a relevant 
industry (or industries).   
  
A.2  Vote Subsamples 
  All results that we report in the paper’s tables include all votes.  However, it is important to note that 
we have looked at a number of other subsets of votes as well, and that the results are robust across all of these 
subsamples.  First, looking only at final votes on bills that eventually are passed into law gives roughly identical 
results in terms of magnitude and significance.
32  The reason we report results for all votes in the paper is that 
we believe vote-trading within the social network may be going on across many types of votes.   
Second, in Table VI in the paper we show a number of vote subsamples according to important 
economic sub-classifications within our sample, and show that no single subsample drives our results.   
Specifically, we split our sample out separately for every school, every Senator, and every Congress-Session.  
We then run our tests separately for every sub-set (for instance, in the school case, we run our tests separately 
for every school that appears in our sample), and report average coefficients across the subsets (along with the 
cross-sectional t-stat across all school estimates).  Using this method drastically reduces power, but equally 
weights across each subsample we consider (in the case of Congress-Session, for example, we only have 20 
estimates (20 years) that enter into the average coefficient estimate, and 20 observations entering into the 
standard error measurement).  Thus, if our results were driven by a certain subsample, or a small set of 
subsamples, the equally-weighted average of the coefficients across subsamples would look much different in 
magnitude than the pooled regressions (and likely significance, given the then implied differences in estimates 
across subsamples), and so these tests would yield different implications.  From Table VI, we see that our 
school network effects are remarkably consistent across all subsamples, using school, Senator, or Congress-
Session.  Again, we are happy to provide the sub-sample estimates for every Senator, every school, and every 
Congress-Session.     
                                                 
32 Note that this separation into measures is very similar to Theriault (2006), which separates procedural and non-procedural votes.  
Our measures category matches closely to his “Substantive Votes” category.  
 
 
  Lastly, we have used variation in “important” bills to each Senator.  We considered using measures of 
important votes identified by Mayhew (1991) and updated on his website,
33 and also Edwards et al. (1997, 
2000).  These are certainly valid measures of important bills at the bill level.  However, we instead opt to use a 
measure of “important” bills defined at the Senator-bill level.  In other words, we allow the same bill to be 
important or unimportant for different sets of Senators.  We define “importance” quite flexibly throughout the 
paper, using important to the given Senator’s party, state (through industries domiciled there), and ideology.  
We then interact these measures of important bills for the given Senator (or use varying subsamples),
34 and 
show how our estimated impacts vary.  Throughout the paper, we show that school networks do have quite a 
different impact across important and unimportant votes to the given Senator (and also important and 
unimportant votes to other Senators in the given Senator’s school network).  We think these are important and 
strong validating pieces of evidence.  In sum, the subsample analyses we have done helps to pin down and 
strengthen the mechanism of school network influence. 
                                                 
33 http://pantheon.yale.edu/~dmayhew/data3.html 
34 These two methods are obviously nearly equivalent, except that the subsample method allows all regression coefficients to vary (be 
freely estimated) across subsamples, whereas the interaction method (including main effects) only allows the intercept and interacted 
coefficient to vary.  In Table IV where we use both, you can see that the two methods (not surprisingly) yield nearly identical results 
in our sample.  
 
 
Table A1: Industry Assignment Keywords and Cut-offs 
 
This table shows the keywords used in assigning the full text of each bill in our sample to the resultant industries covered by the bill, 
along with the cut-offs for the percentile in the distribution of that keyword for the entire sample.  We assign the given industry to a 
bill if any one of its keywords is above the 85th percentile cut-off given in the table.  We choose a subset of the 49 industries (Fama-
French Industry Classification) that we use, as the table would otherwise be prohibitively long.  We are happy to provide the entire 
table of keywords and cut-offs upon request.  
 
Fama-French Industry 
# / Industry Name  Keyword 
Count 
Greater Than / Equal 
To 
Count 
Percentile 
    
 agricultur-  12 85 
 animal  feed  7 85 
 corn  4 85 
1 – Agriculture  crop(s) 14 85 
 farm(s)(land)  11 85 
 fishing  8 85 
 livestock  7 85 
 wheat  8 85 
    
    
 air  force  31 85 
  Ammunition 15 85 
 armed  force(s)  10 85 
  Army 13 85 
 gun(s)(runners)(powder) 8 85 
26 – Defense marine  corps  30 85 
 Military 11 85 
 missile(s)  23 85 
 national  guard  30 85 
 Navy 19 85 
 Ordnance  7 85 
 space  vehicle(s)  3 85 
  Tanks 9 85 
 weapon(s)  15 85 
    
    
 broker  dealer(s)  3 85 
 closed  end  2 85 
 commodity  broker(s)  14 85 
  financial services firm(s) 2 85 
 investment  bank(s)  8 85 
 investment  firm(s)  2 85 
48 – Trading investment  management 6 85 
 investment  trust(s)  12 85 
 mutual  fund(s)  3 85 
 reit(s)  44 85 
  broker-dealer(s)  No Keyword Count Information Available
  closed-end  No Keyword Count Information Available
 security  broker(s)  Keyword  removed : Only 2 bills with the 
keyword, and all appear in definition clauses 
 unit  trust(s)  No  Keyword  Count Information Available
 
 
  
 
 
Table A2: Industry Assignments by State 
 
This table shows the 3 most important industries for each state at the beginning, midpoint, and endpoint of our sample.   
“Importance” is measured by summing up the market equity of all publicly traded firms in each industry residing in a state, and then 
ranking industries.  We thus show below the three largest industries operating in each given state over each Congress.  We choose a 
subset of states and Congresses, as the table would otherwise be prohibitively long.  We are happy to provide the entire table of 
states, industries operating in those states, and most important industries for each state and Congress upon request.  
 
 
State  Fama-French 
Industry #  Industry Name  Congress 
TX 30  Oil 101
TX 31  Utilities 101
TX 32  Telecom 101
TX 30  Oil 105
TX 32  Telecom 105
TX 35  Computers 105
TX 30  Oil 110
TX 31  Utilities 110
TX 32  Telecom 110
  
NY 45  Banks 101
NY 46  Insurance 101
NY 48  Trading 101
NY 45  Banks 105
NY 46  Insurance 105
NY 48  Trading 105
NY 45  Banks 110
NY 46  Insurance 110
NY 48  Trading 110
  
CA 32  Telecom 101
CA 35  Computers 101
CA 43  Retail 101
CA 35  Computers 105
CA 36  Software 105
CA 37  Electronic  Equipment 105
CA 35  Computers 110
CA 36  Software 110
CA 37  Electronic  Equipment 110
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table A3: Expanded Information on School Networks 
 
This table shows an expanded version of Table II.  It includes a more detailed breakdown of political affiliations within each network, along with the same information 
for religion affiliations within each network.  Additionally, it includes a list of the states that are represented in each network, along with the most represented state 
within each network.  
 
 
 
 
Rank Academic institution #degrees %total #senators # Rep # Dem # Indep
Most 
Represented 
Religions
#i nt h a t
religion
total #
reported 
religion
# unique
states
Most 
Represent
ed State
#f r o m
that state
All States
1 Harvard University 35 9.33 30 12 17 1
Catholic, 
Methodist, Jewish
4 2 52 4M I 3
AK, CO, DE, FL, HI, ID, IL, LA, MA, MD, MI, NC, NH, NJ, NM, NY,
PA, RI, SD, TN, VT, WA, AI, WV
2 Yale University 23 6.13 20 8 10 2
Episcopalian, 
Presbyterian, 
Jewish
3 15 13 PA 3 CA, CT, FL, MA, MN, MO, NY, OH, OK, PA, RI, VT, WY
3 University of Virginia 10 2.67 9 4 5 0 Episcopalian 2 5 7 VA 3 FL, IN, MA, MO, RI, TX, VA
4 T S t a n f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y 82 . 1 3 8 170J e w i s h 266O R ,  C A 2C A ,  C O ,  M T ,  N D ,  N M ,  O R
4 T G e o r g e t o w n  U n i v e r s i t y 82 . 1 3 6 240R o m a n  C a t h o l i c 456
AK, IL,
ME, VA,
VT, WY
1 AK, IL, ME, VA, VT, WY
6 T O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y 71 . 8 7 7 340M e t h o d i s t 367
IN, LA,
MD, NC,
NJ, OK,
TX
1 IN, LA, MD, NC, NJ, OK, TX
6 T V a n d e r b i l t  U n i v e r s i t y 71 . 8 7 5 230B a p t i s t 241T N 5T N
6T University of Chicago 7 1.87 7 2 4 1
Presbyterian, 
Assemblies of 
God, United 
Church of Christ, 
Roman Catholic
1 4 6 MO 2 IL, MN, MO, NJ, PA, VT
9T Princeton University 6 1.6 6 3 3 0
Episcopalian, 
Presbyterian
2 5 5 MO 2 MD, MO, NJ, RI, TN
9T University of Georgia 6 1.6 4 3 1 0 Methodist 2 2 2 GA 3 GA, TX
9T University of Alabama 6 1.6 4 3 1 0
Presbyterian, 
Methodist
242A L 3A L ,  C A
9T University of Mississippi 6 1.6 3 3 0 0 Southern Baptist 3 3 1 MS 3 MS
9 T U n i v e r s i t y  o f  M i n n e s o t a 61 . 6 4 211
Congregationalist, 
Lutheran
123M N 2C O ,  M N ,  N D
All 
Degrees
375 100
Schools Represented in the top 10 School Networks in the US Senate 
 
 
Table A4: Top Senators by School Connected Voting 
 
This table lists the top 20 Senators in our sample in terms of their propensity to vote with their school networks.  In particular, the ranking was made using the separate 
regressions run for each Senator described in Table VIII (Column 4).  The ranking is then based on their coefficient estimate on School Connected Votes (SCV).  The top 
20 Senators based on this ranking over our sample period of the 101st-110th Congresses are then listed below in alphabetical order of last name. 
 
 
Name  Birthdate Birthplace  Party  Employment  State Undergraduate  Graduate 
John B. Breaux  3/1/1944  Crowley, LA  Democrat  Attorney  LA  University of Southwestern LA  Louisiana State University (LSU) 
Thomas Richard Carper  1/23/1947  Beckley, WV  Democrat  Public official  DE  Ohio state University  University of Delaware 
John H. Chafee  10/22/1922  Providence, RI  Republic  Attorney  RI  Yale University  Harvard University 
Larry E. Craig  7/20/1945  Council, ID  Republic  Rancher  ID  University of Idaho 
Wyche Jr. Fowler  10/6/1940  Atlanta, GA  Democrat  Attorney GA  Davidson  College Emory  University 
H. John III Heinz  10/23/1938  Pittsburgh, PA  Republic  Businessperson PA Yale  University Harvard  University 
Daniel K. Inouye  9/7/1924  Honolulu, HI  Democrat  Attorney  HI  University of Hawaii  George Washington University 
Johnny Isakson  12/28/1944  Atlanta, GA  Republic Realtor  GA  University  of  Georgia 
James M. Jeffords  5/11/1934  Rutland, VT  Democrat  Attorney  VT  Yale University  Harvard University 
Dirk Kempthorne  10/29/1951  San Diego, CA  Republic  Public Official  ID  University of Idaho 
Mary L. Landrieu  11/23/1955  Arlington, VA  Democrat  Real Estate Agent  LA  Louisiana State University (LSU) 
Harlan Mathews  1/17/1927  Walker County, AL  Democrat Public  Official  TN  Jacksonville State University  Vanderbilt University 
James A. McClure  12/27/1924  Payette, ID  Republic  Attorney  ID  Idaho State University  University of Idaho 
Zell Bryan Miller  2/24/1932  Young Harris, GA  Democrat  Public Official  GA  University of Georgia  University of Georgia 
Earl Benjamin (Ben) Nelson  5/17/1941  McCook, NE  Democrat  Attorney  NE  University of Nebraska  University of Nebraska 
Samuel A. Nunn  9/8/1938  Perry, GA  Democrat  Attorney GA  Emory  University Emory  University 
David Pryor  8/29/1934  Camden, AR  Democrat  Attorney  AR  University of Arkansas  University of Arkansas 
Mark Pryor  1/10/1963  Fayetteville, AR  Democrat Attorney  AK  University  of  Arkansas  University of Arkansas 
Arlen Specter  2/12/1930  Wichita, KS  Republic  Attorney  PA  University of Pennsylvania  Yale University 
Steven D. Symms  4/23/1938  Nampa, ID  Republic  Farmer  ID  University of Idaho 
 
 
  
 
Table A5: Top Schools by School Connected Voting 
 
This table lists the top 20 schools in our sample in terms of their propensity to have Senators vote with their school networks.  In 
particular, the ranking was made using the separate regressions run for each school described in Table VIII (Column 3).  The ranking is 
then based on their coefficient estimate on School Connected Votes (SCV).  The top 20 schools based on this ranking over our sample 
period of the 101st-110th Congresses are then listed below in alphabetical order name.  The second column of the table then lists whether 
the school was also on the top 10 list of schools most represented in the 101st-110th Congresses (shown in Table II). 
 
University  One of the Most Represented Schools in the Senate 
University of Alabama  Yes 
Colorado School of Mines 
Davidson College 
University of Delaware 
Emory University 
University of Georgia  Yes 
George Mason University 
Huntington College 
University of Idaho 
Idaho State University 
Jacksonville State University 
Louisiana State University 
University of Mississippi  Yes 
Mount Saint Agnes College 
Oregon State University 
University of Pennsylvania 
University of Southwestern LA 
Stanford University  Yes 
St. Joseph's University 
University of Washington 
Yale University  Yes  
 
Table A6: The Impact of School Ties on Voting Behavior in the U.S. House of Representatives 
 
This table reports panel regressions of individual votes on the voting behavior of U.S. Representatives.  The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the 
Representative voted "Yea," and zero otherwise.  In Columns 1, School Connected Votes is the percentage of Representatives from the same school as the 
Representative in question who voted yes on the given bill; in Column 2, School Connected Votes is the sum of Representatives from the same school as 
the Representative in question who voted yes on the given bill.  State Votes is the percentage (in Column 1), or sum (in Column 2), of Representatives from 
the same state as the Representative in question who voted yes on the given bill.  Party Votes is the percentage (in Column 1), or sum (in Column 2), of 
Representatives from the same party as the Representative in question who voted yes on the given bill. Congress fixed effects, Congress-Session-Vote (C-S-
Vote) fixed effects, and Representative -fixed effects are included where indicated.  All standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the Representative level, 
and these clustered standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 
10%.  
 
 
Dependent Variable: Vote(Yes/No) 
 (1) (2)
Votes Sample  House House
Measure of Connections % Sum
 
School Connected  0.019*** 0.004***
Votes  [0.004]  [0.001] 
School Connected Votes
(School and Degree)     
School Connected Votes
(School, Degree, and Year)     
State Votes  0.160*** 0.004***
  [0.012]  [0.000] 
Party Votes  0.995*** 0.005***
  [0.001]  [0.000] 
 
Fixed Effects  C-S-Vote C-S-Vote
Fixed Effects  Rep Rep
Adjusted R2  0.57 0.54
No. of Obs.  3444036
   
3444036